Cognitive Science

  (out of 5 stars)

Neurologist Oliver Sacks catalogs his experiences with patients suffering unusual neurological conditions in his book The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales. As the title suggests, the book is a collection of first-hand case studies witnessed by Sacks during his days treating these patients. I've collected several of Sacks' books, and having decided to start reading his work with this book, it may be a while before I pick up the next.

This was easily one of the more disappointing reads of the year. Sacks comes highly rated as an author, and in the few video lectures and discussions I've watched of him, I had high expectations for Mistook. However, the format is just dreadful, and the writing, while presenting interesting subjects, reads more like a dictation from a doctor to his fellow practitioners than a discourse meant for popular science readers.

Each chapter is self-contained, excepting a bare few references to similar cases across a couple of chapters, and presents Sacks' version of neurological patient exhibiting unusual behavior and/or symptoms. There is no apparent pattern to the stories, they are just thrown together as a collection of essays with no attempt to draw a narrative. Even within each chapter, the flow is simply bad as a specific detail might garner two full pages of description while an equally-deserving (and necessary) set of details are all packed into a single sentence. The balance is just wrong, and again, it feels like Sacks is writing a case study for a fellow neurologist and then, at the last minute, remembered to "dumb it down" a bit for some of his readers.

Wholly clinical in its treatment of the subjects, the book does not try hard to draw the reader in and compel him to understand and explore the subject matter. The reader is left with a few interesting stories handled in a clinical manner which a few minutes of reading Wikipedia articles would have matched in terms of pleasurable reading. While undoubtedly of interest to many, and admitting that I seem to be in the minority in being disappointed by Mistook, the book is simply a let down to this reader who is greatly interested in the neurological behaviors Sacks witnessed. Two and one-half stars.

  (out of 5 stars)

From the onset of this book, Dennett offers what amounts to one long argument about whether or not religion should be subjected to rational inquiry. A reasonable question, to be sure, but despite it being a legitimate point of conversation with the reader, Dennett unfortunately aims beyond the reader to a very small subset of people capable of conducting inquiries of this sort. He often asks the reader to consider questioning his/her own views and stances, but it is clear by the end of the book that his entire 'soft rant' is really directed at encouraging further research on the issue.

I like Dan Dennett a lot, and have spent many hours learning from his books, speeches, and insights, but I feel like this book was a mediocre use of my time. Granted, I accept that he was preaching to the choir on his central thesis (that we should indeed submit religion to rational inquiry), but the entire book is muddled and largely filler. He ends each chapter with two paragraphs--a summary of that chapter and a preview of the next. Each subsection of each chapter starts with several quotes more-or-less on target, and uses extensive (and large) quotes from other thinkers throughout the book. The entire work quickly begins to feel like a thesis-by-committee, of which Dennett is largely acting as managing editor.

Dennett is a philosopher, so you expect some redundant passages as he hones in on specific points, but often he spends several pages belaboring an argument that (by that point) would have already been accepted or not by the reader. As a bit of frustrated research, I read only every third paragraph in one chapter and jotted down what I felt were his main points. I then reread the entire chapter in full to see if it provided any additional insight. It did not. Dennett uses a lot of filler in this book that should have been condensed or left out entirely.

In parts of the book that deserved better scientific treatment, such as his theories of the origins and evolution of religion (and religious memes), he instead breezes over the details and offers that the necessary research had not yet been done. Gah, frustrating 'insights' from a guy I much respect.

I hate his use of the term 'brights' (as I detest when any other 'bright' uses that term-- it is ridiculous and distracting and forces the reader to swallow a bit of revulsion at what the term insinuates, even when Dennett clearly defines what he means by it).

Having dragged myself through to the end, it is clear in the last chapter that Dennett really was talking past me and instead directing his book at researchers and religious leaders, pleading with them to take up his challenge and start investigating religion's many aspects, both good and bad. Again, I find myself in very broad agreement with Dennett on almost every aspect of his thesis, but his delivery and substance in Breaking leave a lot to be desired. Three stars. Not a horrible introduction to the argument, but not Dennett's best work.

  (out of 5 stars)

Dr. Susan Blackmore was well known for her study of paranormal psychology long before she took her place in the theory of memetics. Briefly, she takes up the idea as presented in The Selfish Gene (Richard Dawkins) and builds upon the work of others, such as Richard Brodie and Daniel Dennett who have sought to define memes and their effects on humanity. Blackmore takes all of this a step further and proposes that memes are not just ideas that pass from brain to brain, but are a true second replicator capable as originally proposed by Dawkins. Her theory puts forth the idea that memes have coevolved with genes in the human species and now are the dominant replicator on the planet.

Early on in this book, I felt the effort was a bit hollow. Most of the first several dozen pages reads more like a topical survey of existing work on the subject and a sort of dry recitation of where thing stand. Certainly, this is normal for any popular science book, but the treatment here was a bit lacking for my taste.

However, once Blackmore is free from her history lesson, she launches into a challenging assertion of how memes became established as replicators, and the even more controversial theory that memes have driven genes to develop physical brains capable of spreading memes.

Dr. Blackmore offers that memes first came about from early humans imitating other humans for advantages (such as better tool use or optimal berry color determination). Once this began, the next step involved memetic selection favoring those who imitated the most successful imitators (since they would be the most likely candidates to have the ability to propagate memes). Next, natural memetic selection favored those who chose to mate with other imitators (meaning that genes favoring the ability to pass on memes were more successful at propagation). Finally, sexual selection for imitations would lead to the arms race Blackmore asserts drove brain size to enormous (and otherwise unnatural) proportions (her analogy is the costly and over-the-top display of male peacock feathers).

Language is presented not simply as an efficiency for communication and coordination but as a means by which memes themselves increase their fecundity (ability to reproduce or be reproduced). Since memes were best able to reproduce through imitation, language spread quickly since it so easily allowed memes to move from brain to brain. Writing, and later inventions such as the printing press, telephone, and internet offered even better efficiencies for meme replication.

Blackmore also offers strong discussion of the power of memes to drive behavior in the modern world despite the best interests of the genes in bodies. She gives a treatment on sex (birth control, smaller family sizes, porn, etc...) and religion (priests and nuns who concentrate on spreading religious memes rather than genes) as proof that such powerful ability makes memetic replication the driving force in our cultural (and therefore genetic) evolution.

Specifically, she proposes that memes are the driver of the contentious altruism phenomenon. Since we have an early desire to imitate successful imitators, and kin selection likely leads toward locally-based altruism, memes which encourage further altruism spread quickly. Blackmore suggests that nice, popular, and successful people 1) are more likely to come into contact with more people than are mean, unpopular, or unsuccessful people, and 2) are more likely to be imitated as a result (the nice guy who throws big parties and gives gifts will most likely have more imitators than those who scowl and remain isolated). Because of this, altruism spreads like a virus (as do all memes), and since altruism encourages more contact and better social behavior, the effect quickly spreads throughout most of the population. Morals and kindness likely find their roots in this process of imitation and memetic natural selection.

Getting deeper into this process, Dr. Blackmore offers her theory that the idea of 'self' and 'I' are the ultimate memeplex (groups of memes which work together in much the same way that chromosomes and genomes do). She asserts that the illusion of self is only in existence due to memetic natural selection and not some inherent and tangible part of humanity (such as a soul).

Finally, she contends that memes (backed up by some psychological research) provide no means of free will (Blackmore explicitely defines memetic replication as the source of human decisions), and that free will itself is simply a false meme that has spread thanks to other memes and memeplexes (such as religion, humanism, etc). Because we have no free will, the author argues that 'self' is not functionally useful in our lives and that we should instead focus on the 'now', letting our sense of individual identity and decision making fall aside as we cast off our illusions and attempt to enjoy what she considers a different type of conciousness.

Having just finished Daniel Dennett's excellent and powerful thoughts on consciousness (Consciousness Explained), I was prepared pretty well for what Blackmore offered. She cites Dennett (and Dawkins) frequently, although she does offer alternative theories on some points.

While I do believe (I can hear Blackmore trying to argue with 'I do believe' as I type it) she has put forth an excellent theory on memetics that goes a long way toward explaining broad areas left unexplainable by current neo-Darwinian evolution, most especially altruism, she admits throughout the book that she is only offering theories based on very early and sparse evidence. She offers testable scenarios and experiments all through the book which she believes might empirically confirm (or deny) her theory's assertions.

Her final chapter decends into a sort of conscious nihilism whereby she suggests the psychological version of Tim Leary's 'Tune In, Turn On, Drop Out'. Most of this chapter's assertions appear to be a much more personal solution, and I can't say that I agree that we should simply 'get out of the way of the memes'. While I think she may have the process down correctly (namely that memes are replicators in power in the modern world, largely responsible for physically large brains and consciousness, and that free will is largely an illusion), this solution of abandoning any pretense of personal intent feels like a cop-out. Blackmore tells us early on that ignorance of the underlying structure of genetics (DNA/RNA) did not prevent enormous progress on theories and practice of natural selection. I feel she gives her own theory different treatment under similar circumstances. We don't yet know exactly what, if anything, would be the underlying structure of memetics, but that shouldn't push us to 'get out of the way' at all. I see two options: the one she proposes (accepting that we have no power to control memes or any free will or personal intent) and letting go of the struggle over memes (anxiety, worry, doubt, etc), or an alternative view which is willing to accept many of the same proposals without disengaging. We never thought we would have the power to manipulate natural selection through genetics, and yet now we do. Memetics might offer a similar opportunity, and I feel ignoring this possibility feels a bit cheap, especially from someone who has been used so successfully by some outstanding and insightful memeplexes just to publish this book and work on this theory.

I would recommend that anyone wishing to read this book should first read Dawkins' The Selfish Gene (and probably Extended Phenotype). Dan Dennett's Consciousness Explained is frequently cited in Meme Machine and reading it will help greatly in processing the theory Blackmore presents (though note that it is a deep philosophical book). Four stars and highly recommended to those whose have some ground knowledge of genes and memes going in.